The hippocampus plays a critical role in supporting episodic memory. 7
At present, there are at least two major accounts of how this might happen. One 34 possibility is that the hippocampus maintains a continuously varying representation of 35 temporal context, possibly via internally generated cell assembly sequences (Buzsáki & 36 Llinás, 2017; Levy, 1996; Rodriguez & Levy, 2001; Wallenstein, Eichenbaum, & 37 Hasselmo, 1998). Consistent with this idea, results from single-unit recording studies in 38 rodents have suggested that cell populations in the hippocampus can faithfully 39 represent temporal relationships across both short (Kraus et al., 2015 (Kraus et al., , 2013  theories of episodic memory that operationalize temporal context in terms of changes in 44 cognitive states or experiences (Estes, 1955; Howard & Kahana, 2002) . Although 45 temporal context models generally assume that representations of temporal context 46 change gradually, these models also predict that context can abruptly change to reflect 47 one's current cognitive state (Lohnas, Polyn, & Kahana, 2015; Polyn, Norman, & 48 Kahana, 2009) . 49 missing behavioral data, two participants were excluded for excessive motion that 73 prevented tracing of hippocampal subfields, one participant was excluded due to an 74 experimenter error at data collection that resulted in the incorrect stimuli being seen, 75 and one participant was excluded because they only had one run of usable data after 76 discarding motion-contaminated and data-collection contaminated runs. The results 77 below reflect data from 24 remaining participants (Mage = 22.85 years, SD = 3.06 78 years, Nfemale = 13). One of these 24 participants was excluded from behavioral 79 cognitive and temporal context analyses due to partially missing data; since the brain 80 imaging data for this participant were complete and did not depend on this behavior 81 being recorded, they were included in all other analyses. 82
Encoding. Participants viewed eight 36-item lists of still pictures of everyday 83 objects (e.g., contact lens case, french fries; http://cvcl.mit.edu/mm/uniqueObjects.html; 84 see Figure 1 ). Object assignment to list and presentation order of objects within a list 85 were uniquely randomized for each participant via the Matlab randperm function. To 86 encourage participants to learn temporal relationships amongst items in a list (Palombo, 87 Di Lascio, Howard, & Verfaellie, 2019), each list was presented three times in a mini-88 block before subjects saw items from the next list (e.g., 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2...8, 8, 8). Mini-89 blocks were separated with a self-paced break. Presentation order of objects within a 90 list was identical for all three list presentations. 91
Objects remained on the screen for 2.5 seconds (timing and presentation 92 parameters were controlled via Presentation [Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, 93 CA, www.neurobs.com]) while the participant made a yes/no button response to an 94 orienting question (cognitive context). To manipulate cognitive context, each object was 95 associated with one of four questions: Would this item fit in a refrigerator?, Would this 96 item fit in a bathtub?, Would you find this item in a convenience store?, Would you find 97 this item in a supermarket?. Each of the four questions was presented equally often in 98 each block, and question/object pairs remained the same across all three list 99 presentations. Participants were instructed that this was a decision-making task and 100 that there would be some repetition but to concentrate on doing the task. Participants 101
were not aware that memory for these questions would be tested later, thus the learning 102 of question and temporal context information was incidental. 103
Scanned object recognition. While in the MRI scanner, participants saw each 104 of the 288 old objects from encoding as well as 72 new objects presented one at a time 105 for 2.5 seconds with a jittered ITI ranging from 2-15 seconds (mean ITI jitter = 6 106 seconds). Objects were divided into 6 runs (60 trials per run). Object order within a run 107 was pseudo-randomized such that objects with the same encoding question always had 108 at least one intervening object (e.g., fridge, convenience store, bathtub, fridge, 109 supermarket, fridge, etc.) to help minimize encoding context reinstatement biases on PS 110 results (see Multivariate Results below). Proximity of objects from encoding mini-blocks 111
(1-8) was not considered in the pseudo-randomization. 112
While in the scanner, participants were instructed to indicate via button press 113 whether or not they remembered the object on a 4-point scale: 1=new, 2=familiar (old 114 but no remembered details), 3=remembered non-temporal details (e.g., the encoding 115 question, something about the object itself, or an association they made with the 116 object), 4=remembered temporal detail (e.g., in what list or when they had seen the 117 object during encoding). Responses for remembered judgments were collapsed into a 118 single response bin for behavioral and fMRI analyses. 119
Source memory: Cognitive context. After completing MRI scanning, 120 participants returned to the lab where they completed a cognitive context source 121 memory task. In this phase, participants saw all 288 studied objects from encoding and 122 were asked to indicate which encoding question (fridge/bathtub/convenience 123 store/grocery store) had been associated with the object. Objects were presented 124 across four blocks of 72 trials each. Within each block, there were an equal number of 125 objects from each encoding mini-block (1-8). Presentation order of objects was uniquely 126 randomized by participant within each source memory block. Objects appeared on the 127 screen until the participant had made their source memory judgment. There was no 128 opportunity to guess or skip objects. 129
Source memory: Temporal context. After completing the cognitive context 130 source memory test, participants again saw the 288 old objects from encoding and this 131 time were asked to indicate in which mini-block (1-8) the object had appeared. Objects 132 were again divided across four blocks of 72 trials with a different randomization order 133 than was used in the task context source memory test. Objects remained on the screen 134 until the participant had made their response. There was no opportunity to guess or skip 135 temporal context judgments. if the frame displacement exceeded the voxel size. As reported earlier, three 167 participants were excluded for motion in excess of these thresholds; of the 24 subjects 168 included in the analyses, 9 had runs excluded based on these thresholds (mean 169 number of removed runs = 0.92, SD = 1.38; ranging from 0-4 runs). 170
Pattern similarity analyses. PS analyses were conducted on beta maps 171 generated from unsmoothed data in native subject space. Following the least squares 172 separate procedure described by Mumford (2012) , single trial models were generated to 173 estimate the unique beta map for every trial in a run (N=60). Within each single trial 174 model, the first regressor modeled the trial of interest with a stick function, the second 175 regressor modeled all other trials in that run, six regressors were used to capture 176 motion, and any additional spike regressors as identified by our QA scripts were used to 177 capture additional residual variance. Voxel-wise patterns of hemodynamic activity were 178 separately extracted for each ROI from the single trial beta images. To ensure robust 179 ability to detect differences in PS, we required temporal signal-to-noise ratios (TSNR) in 180 a region to be above 20 (approximately 2 standard deviations below the mean global 181 36 objects that were each randomly paired with one of four encoding questions ("Would 217 this item fit in a fridge?", "Would this item fit in a bathtub?", "Would you find this item in a 218 supermarket?", "Would you find this item in a convenience store?"). Each list was 219 repeated three times in a row to promote learning of the temporal relationships amongst 220 the items. Objects appeared in the same order and with the same question (cognitive 221 context) across all repetitions. High-resolution functional magnetic resonance brain 222 imaging (fMRI) was used to examine hippocampal activity patterns during a recognition 223 memory test for these objects, allowing us to examine activity pattern similarity as a 224
function of whether pairs of items were encoded within the same or similar temporal 225 contexts (i.e., studied in the same list or temporally proximal lists), and/or the same 226 cognitive context (i.e., associated encoding question) 227 228
Results. 229
Behavioral results. During MRI scanning participants performed a recognition 230 memory test requiring judgments as to whether each item was recognized on the basis 231 of recollection of specific item and source information from the study phase (see 232
Method). Pattern similarity analyses were restricted to correctly remembered items. 233
Correct remember judgments were the most common response (mean hit rate = 234 0.69, SD = 0.19), and, for these items, participants showed high accuracy at 235 remembering the associated encoding task context (mean hit rate = 0.71, SD = 0.12). 236
Memory for the exact ("same") temporal context (list 1-8) was poor (mean hit rate = 237 0.18, SD = 0.03), but, we reasoned that, even if participants were unable to recall the 238 exact list identity, they might have memory for the "similar" temporal context associated 239 with each item. We therefore re-scored each trial according to whether the participant 240 could accurately determine whether it was presented in the "similar" (first half (lists 1-4) 241 or the second half (lists 5-8)) versus "different" (across halves, i.e., list 1/list5, list 1/list 6, 242 etc.) temporal context of the encoding phase. On this metric, memory for similar 243 temporal context (mean hit rate for list half = 0.59, SD = 0.04) was reliably greater than 244 chance of 0.5, t(22) = 8.74, p < 0.001. Thus, although participants did not have access 245 to the precise list in which an item had been studied, they were able to retrieve 246 information about the item's temporal context at a coarse level. 247 fMRI results: Hippocampal Subfields We next tested whether activity patterns 248 in the hippocampal subfields (CA1, CA23DG, subiculum) during memory retrieval 249 carried information about the context in which the item was previously encountered. temporal context]) and/or cognitive (i.e., same encoding task vs. different encoding task) 254
context when the items were originally learned. 255
We first considered when items came from the "same" temporal encoding context 256 (same vs. different list). No hippocampal subfield varied its PS at retrieval with respect 257 to the same temporal context (all X 2 < 0.5, all ps > 0.40). In CA23DG, we found that PS 258 was higher during retrieval of items associated with the same cognitive context 259 compared to items associated with different cognitive contexts (X 2 (1) = 4.63, p perm1000 = 260 0.031). No other subfield varied its PS at retrieval with respect to cognitive context alone 261 (all X 2 < 0.3, all ps > 0.55) nor the combination of temporal and cognitive context (all X 2 262 < 0.80, all ps > 0.30). 263
We next considered whether PS might depend on whether items shared a 264 "similar" temporal context at encoding (same vs. different half of the encoding phase). 265 PS levels did not vary by similar temporal context alone (X 2 (1) = 0.08, p perm1000 = 0.815). 266
Thus, PS levels were not modulated by same or similar temporal context alone. In 267 CA23DG, we found that PS was higher during retrieval of items that were associated 268 with the same cognitive context than for items that were associated with different 269 cognitive contexts (X 2 (1) = 4.68, p perm1000 = 0.037; see Figure 2 ). Thus, irrespective of 270 how we defined temporal context (same, similar), PS in CA23DG was higher for items 271 that were associated with the same cognitive context. This effect was qualified by a 272 significant similar temporal by cognitive context interaction (X 2 (1) = 8.11, p perm1000 = 273 0.008), such that the effect of cognitive context was larger for items that were in similar 274 temporal contexts (same half) than for items that were in different temporal contexts 275 (different half) particularly when these items shared the same cognitive context. 276
In CA1, PS levels did not vary by similar temporal context (X 2 (1) = 2.42, p perm1000 277 = 0.122), cognitive context (X 2 (1) = 0.08, p perm1000 = 0.757), nor when we considered 278 both temporal and cognitive context (X 2 (1) = 0.84, p perm1000 = 0.329). In subiculum, PS 279 levels did not vary by similar temporal context (X 2 (1) = 0.11, p perm1000 = 0.751) or 280 cognitive context (X 2 (1) = 0.27, p perm1000 = 0.622), however, we found that PS was 281 marginally higher for items that were studied relative to the same question but studied in 282 different list halves as compared to all other conditions (X 2 (1) = 2.91, p perm1000 = 0.082). observed an interaction between cognitive context, same temporal context, and 299
hemisphere (X 2 (3) = 8.91, p perm1000 = 0.037). Looking across hemispheres, PS levels 300 only varied reliably in left aPHC on the basis of cognitive context (X 2 (1) = 7.89, p perm1000 301 = 0.007). We found no other significant effects involving same temporal context (all X 2 < 302 0.7, all ps > 0.4), nor the combination of same temporal and cognitive context (all X 2 < 303 1.2, all ps > 0.2) in either hemisphere. PS in posterior PHC (pPHC) was marginally 304 greater for items in the different as compared to same temporal context (X 2 (1) = 3.75, 305 p perm1000 = 0.055), but did not vary on the basis of cognitive context alone (X 2 (1) = 1.22, 306 p perm1000 = 0.263). This marginal effect of same temporal context in pPHC was qualified 307 by a significant same temporal context by cognitive context interaction (X 2 (1) = 8.18, 308 p perm1000 = 0.002). PS levels in PRC did not vary by temporal encoding context (X 2 (1) = 309 0.001, p perm1000 = 0.981), cognitive context (X 2 (1) = 0.51, p perm1000 = 0.497), nor the 310 combination of temporal and cognitive context (X 2 (1) = 0.82, p perm1000 = 0.354). 311
We next considered whether PS in MTL neocortical areas might depend on 312 whether items shared a similar temporal context at encoding. In aPHC, we observed an 313 interaction between cognitive context, similar temporal context, and hemisphere (X 2 (1) = 314 9.17, p perm1000 = 0.028). This reflects the fact that in left aPHC, voxel PS was greater for 315 items studied relative to different cognitive contexts (X 2 (1) = 7.96, p perm1000 = 0.006), as 316 well as for items from different temporal contexts (X 2 (1) = 5.75, p perm1000 = 0.015), but 317 did not vary based on the combination of cognitive and temporal context (X 2 (1) = 0.88, 318 p perm1000 = 0.349). In right aPHC, voxel PS did not carry information about an item's 319 cognitive context (X 2 (1) = 0.75, p perm1000 = 0.372) or temporal (X 2 (1) = 1.49, p perm1000 = 320 0.226) context, nor their combination (X 2 (1) = 0.27, p perm1000 = 0.60). PS levels did not 321 reliably vary for cognitive context (all X 2 < 1.2, all ps > 0.25), similar temporal context (all 322 X 2 < 0.30, all ps > 0.60), nor the combination of cognitive and temporal context (all X 2 < 323 1.9, all ps > 0.25) in either pPHC or PRC. 324
Discussion. 325
The goal of the present study was to test the extent to which the hippocampus 326
represents absolute temporal information and information about particular cognitive 327 states during recollection of past events. Although cognitive states typically fluctuate 328 over time in a continuous manner, the design of our experiment allowed us to examine 329 the influence of these two aspects of context separately. We found that, during 330 recollection of a study item, CA23DG activity patterns carried information about the 331 cognitive context associated with that item during the study phase. Additionally, 332 cognitive context information evident in CA23DG activity patterns varied over a coarse 333 timescale, such that pattern similarity was highest for pairs of items that were 334 associated with similar temporal and cognitive contexts. Collectively, these findings 335 demonstrate that the hippocampus represents information about past events in a 336 manner that is consistent with temporal context models (Howard & Kahana, 2002 ; context may be encoded in the brain. These representations of temporal and cognitive 343 state contexts seem to rely on the hippocampus (Eichenbaum, 2017; Ranganath, 2019) . 344
In the hippocampus, one candidate mechanism is the coordinated firing of self- that different cell assemblies encoded temporal intervals across the delay period 360 depending on the odor that was to be maintained. In other words, changes in the task 361 context led to substantial changes in the neural ensembles that encoded temporal 362 information during the task. 363
In the present study, we found evidence for the idea that information about 364 cognitive states (i.e., specific task contexts) was carried in hippocampal activity patterns 365 during recollection, and that these patterns also carried relatively coarse-grained 366 information about the temporal context in which the recollected item was initially 367 encountered (see also (DuBrow, Rouhani, Niv, & Norman, 2017) for evidence that 368 contexts can drift slowly). This is consistent with the scale of temporal information 369 participants had access to behaviorally; they were poor at retrieving the exact list an 370 item had been in but had access to information about in which half of the study lists it 371 had occurred. These findings are generally in line with what would be predicted by 372 cognitive models of the representation of temporal context in episodic memory. Initial 373 theories operationalized temporal context as random fluctuations in cognitive states 374 over time (Estes, 1955) , and subsequent theories have incorporated the assumption 375 that temporal context also reflects a time-weighted average of recently processed items 376 and experiences (Howard & Kahana, 2002; Norman et al., 2008; Sederberg et al., 377 2008) . These models would predict that activity patterns during memory retrieval should 378 reflect information about the temporal context associated with each study item (e.g., predicts that if there are abrupt changes in one's cognitive state (e.g., a change in the 383 task that one is performing), items that are temporally proximal can actually have 384 distinct contextual associations (Polyn et al., 2009 ). Thus, the CMR model predicts that, 385 during memory retrieval, reinstatement of temporal context should reflect a conjunction 386 of task-related information and information that reflects elapsed time, similar to what 387 was observed in CA23DG. Though CMR most explicitly incorporates semantic 388 relationships into the temporal context model, we suggest that contextual associations 389 associated with task or cognitive states likely tap into a similar mechanism. Moreover, 390 the model suggests that changing tasks during encoding would break up the temporal 391 context representation during encoding of each list. This prediction is consistent with the 392 fact that we did not see evidence of high pattern similarity across items within the same 393 list, and instead only saw representation of temporal information across coarser 394
timescales. 395
At a broader level, our findings converge with results from a number of recent 396 studies showing that hippocampal activity patterns carry information that generalizes 397 across events that share common elements (Horner, Bisby, Bush, Lin, & Burgess, 2015; 398 Schlichting & Preston, 2015) . Here, we found that activity patterns in the CA23DG 399 subregion generalize across items that shared both temporal and task context. Other 400 findings, however, suggest that hippocampal representations can amplify differences 401 between overlapping experiences ( Stark, 2011). In one recent study, for instance, we found that CA23DG activity patterns 404 during memory retrieval were more different for across pairs of items that were 405 associated with the same episodic context (i.e., objects seen within the same movie) 406 than across pairs of items that were associated with different contexts. The findings of recognition memory tests, people are generally more likely to recollect events that were 414 distinctive than events that were overwhelmingly similar to one another (Hunt, 1995) . If 415 CA23DG represents information about one's cognitive state during an event, then we 416 would expect that this area would be most likely to support successful recollection when 417 those representations are distinctive. In the present study, changes in the encoding task 418 encouraged participants to shift cognitive states abruptly across items within a list. By 419 attending to the task context, a participant could form distinctive memories for the 420 different items that were in the same list. In our previous study (Dimsdale-Zucker et al., 421 2018), however, participants studied lists of items presented in virtual reality videos that 422 depicted navigation through two homes. Thus, the environmental context was 423 overwhelmingly similar across items in the same list, and the cognitive context was not 424 explicitly controlled (i.e., cognitive context likely tracked with environments and the 425 passage of time). To successfully encode items from the study phase, participants 426 needed to form representations that highlighted the distinctive aspects of each item in 427 the list in order to overcome contextual interference at the time of retrieval (Park, Arndt, 428 & Reder, 2006) . We therefore propose that, by binding information about items with 429 information about cognitive contexts, CA23DG can support successful retrieval of 430 overlapping memories that would otherwise be difficult to disambiguate (Yassa & 431 Reagh, 2013) . 432
Our findings also highlight the relative paucity of direct access to memory for 433 temporal context at retrieval. Behavioral measures of memory for temporal context 434
show clustered recall; that is, items studied nearer in time to one another are more likely 435 to be recalled close together (Kahana, 1996) . These findings suggest that, during 436 episodic memory retrieval, people may be mentally transported back to a past cognitive 437 state (Manning, Polyn, Baltuch, Litt, & Kahana, 2011; Tulving, 1983 ). Yet, when people 438
are explicitly asked about temporal order information, they often cannot produce reliable 439 estimates (Jenkins & Ranganath, 2010 ). In the present study, we also found that 440 participants had little explicit access to an item's temporal encoding context. When 441 asked to choose in which of eight lists an item had been studied, participants were 442 essentially at chance. This is not surprising because temporal context models only 443 suggest that memories for temporally proximal events should be associated with similar 444 context representations, but retrieval of context information would not automatically 445 enable a person to determine the exact time at which a previous item was encountered. 446
There is considerable evidence to suggest that people rely on heuristics strategies in 447 order to roughly reconstruct the time at which an event took place (Friedman, 1993) . In 448 our study, this might have been more challenging because, as we have stated above, 449 changes in cognitive context within a list most likely disrupted the continuity of temporal 450 context representations (for a related finding, see (Polyn et al., 2009)) . temporal signal-to-noise ratio was therefore insufficient. Thus, it is possible that in this 462 task where participants had access to both a sense of ongoing time and fluctuating 463 cognitive states, hippocampus and entorhinal cortex could play complementary roles. 464
Taken together, we have shown that that activity patterns in the CA23DG region 465 of the human hippocampus reflected an integrated representation of cognitive and 466 coarse temporal contexts. This finding can help explain how we represent continuously 467 unfolding episodes in a changing world. Outside of the laboratory, we are constantly 468 multitasking between competing goals and responsibilities. The hippocampus, and, 469 specifically CA23DG, may allow us to differentiate between experiences that are 470 associated with different tasks while preserving the temporal flow between experiences. 471 472 473
